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Abstract
We show that cyclical skill mismatch, defined as mismatch between the
skills supplied by college graduates and skills demanded by hiring industries,
is an important mechanism behind persistent career loss from graduating in
recessions. Using Norwegian data, we find a strong countercyclical pattern of
skill mismatch among college graduates. Initial labor market conditions have
a declining but persistent effect on the probability of mismatch early in their
careers. We provide a simple model of industry mobility that is consistent
with our empirical findings. The initially mismatched graduates are also more
vulnerable to business cycle variations at the time of graduation. (JEL E32,
J31, J62).
There is a growing literature showing that labor market conditions at the time of
labor market entry have large and persistent negative effects on careers. For exam-
ple, recent papers by Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012)
show that college graduates in North America suffer persistent declines in earnings
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lasting up to ten years. Similar evidence has been found using data sets from other
countries.1 Understanding the mechanisms driving these persistent career losses
is essential to the design of government employment programs aimed at helping
young workers.
While much is known about the overall magnitude and heterogeneity of these
persistent losses, less work has been done on the mechanisms driving the highly
persistent career losses. The difficulty is to explain the persistence in career losses
from presumably short-lived labor market shocks. The literature has pointed out
that the quality of first job placement is important in explaining the long-term ca-
reer losses. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, Pamminger,
Weber, and Winter-Ebmer (forthcoming) provide evidence that idiosyncratic match
quality is affected by the tightness of the labor market. Kwon, Milgrom, and Hwang
(2010) find that those who graduate in booms are promoted faster, even when con-
ditional on proxies for productivity. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) find that the lower
quality of the first job can explain the persistence of earnings losses, but only when
combined with search frictions that intensify with age.
We add to this literature by showing that skill mismatch, defined as mismatch
between the skills supplied by college graduates and skills demanded by hiring
industries, is another important mechanism behind the persistent career loss from
graduating in recessions. The existing literature pays little attention to the matching
of heterogeneous skills within each cohort of graduates and heterogeneous demand
for skills by hiring industries. We define the type of skill supplied as the field of
study in college. Mismatch occurs when a worker is matched to an industry which
does not value her/his skill. We motivate our definition of skill mismatch by a
simple two-period model in which individuals have heterogeneous skills that de-
preciate if not utilized. In each period, they choose which of two industries to work
in. In this setting, shocks to industry productivity can induce some to work in an
industry they did not expect to choose, and even transitory shocks to productivity
have long-term consequences because of skill dynamics. In the absence of market
1See Oyer (2006) (US), Brunner and Kuhn (2010) (Austria), Kondo (2007); Genda, Kondo, and
Ohta (2010) (Japan) and Stevens (2007) (Germany). While not focusing on college graduates, papers
by Ellwood (1982), Burgess, Propper, Rees, and Shearer (2003) and Raaum and Røed (2006) find
persistent effects of youth unemployment on the careers later in life.
2
inefficiencies, mismatch is efficient and neutral with respect to the business cycle.
We show, however, that with credit constraints and a minimum level of consump-
tion, mismatch can be inefficient, and there is more such inefficient mismatch in
recessions.
Our paper also relates and extends the mismatch literature in the economics of
education by analyzing how skill mismatch varies over the business cycle and how
a business cycle shock may give a persistent career shock.2 Our theoretical model
distinguishes two types of mismatch, efficient mismatch and inefficient mismatch,
and derives the conditions under which they arise. We do not study the career
differences between mismatched and nonmismatched workers. Our focus is on
how skill mismatch varies over the business cycle.
Using administrative panel data from Norway, we show that there is a strong
countercyclical pattern of skill mismatch among college graduates entering the la-
bor market: a typical recession, with a rise in unemployment rate by three percent-
age points, implies an initial increase of about 30% in the probability of mismatch
and a 9% downgrading in the average quality of their matches. The effects of initial
labor market conditions on mismatch decline over time but remain highly persistent
over early careers, suggesting that some graduates never switch back to the “right”
industry. The effects are stronger and more persistent for graduates at the bottom of
the IQ-score distribution and for graduates majoring in subjects with cyclical labor
demands. We also find that initially mismatched graduates (i.e., those who were
matched to the wrong industry in their first job) graduating in bad times experience
persistently worse labor market outcomes when compared with mismatched work-
ers graduating in good times. The careers of graduates who are matched to the right
industry are less affected by graduating in recessions and their small initial career
losses do not persist over time. Our findings suggest that the cyclical mismatch of
college graduates could be an important driving force behind the persistent career
loss found in many studies. For graduates whose mismatch is due to bad labor
market conditions, industry mobility and job mobility are important channels to re-
2See Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) for an overview of the economics literature on skill mis-
match. Note that skills in this literature are defined by types of education, and skill mismatch is
equivalent to over- or undereducation.
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cover from initial losses. For other graduates, within-firm recovery is an important
margin of adjustment. We also make efforts to check how robust our results are in
relation to students’ timing of graduation and region of graduation relative to the
regional unemployment rates. In addition, on a male subpopulation, we control for
differences in the composition of graduates over the business cycle using proxies
for cognitive ability.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes a model that highlights
how skill mismatch might arise over the business cycle, Section 2 explains our
empirical strategy and relates it to previous literature. In Section 3 we present our
data and situate the period we study in recent Norwegian business cycle history
before we provide our results in Section 4 with some robustness tests in Section 5
and concluding remarks in Section 6.
1 How Skill Mismatch Can Arise Over the Business
Cycle—An Analytical Framework
In this section, we provide a simple analytical framework to demonstrate how skill
mismatch might arise and how it relates to the business cycle.
Assume that there are two industries, 1 and 2, and that firms are homogeneous
within each industry. Every worker (recent college graduate) is endowed with a
skill bundle zi = (z1i ,z
2
i ), where z
j
i is the productivity of worker i matched to a firm
in industry j. Some graduates are ex ante more productive in the first industry
(z1i > z
2
i ). Such a worker would have an ex ante expectation of working in industry
1, and we say that such a worker has been trained for industry 1, and we shall
consider it a form of mismatch if he or she works in industry 2. Similarly, the other
workers are trained for industry 2.
We assume that α j is an industry-wide productivity shock to industry j. This
is a random variable realized in each period, just before individuals choose which
industry to work for. We normalize the expectations of α1 and α2 to zero. When
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worker i is matched to industry j, production is
y(i, j;α) = z ji +α
j. (1)
We assume that workers are paid their marginal product, w(i, j;α) = y(i, j;α), and
allow the αs to be potentially correlated in the cross-section, but we assume that
the current realization of α is not informative about future values of α .
We further assume workers to be risk-neutral, and to live for two periods. In
each period, they choose one of the two states in the labor market: they work in
industry 1, or they work in industry 2. Denote the choices as Dit ∈ {1,2}. The
value to a young worker i of working in industry j in period t is
Vt(i, j) = wt(i, j;αt)+βEt max{wt+1(i,1;αt+1,Dit),wt+1(i,2;αt+1,Dit)} . (2)
The expectation is taken with respect to the second period’s realization of the
industry-wide productivity shock αt+1, and β is the discount factor.
The current choice can affect future wages because the evolution of skills, zit ,
might depend on the worker’s choice of industry. We assume that skills that are not
used depreciate at rate γ ,
z jit+1 =
z
j
it× (1− γ), if Dit 6= j,
z jit , if Dit = j.
(3)
In the case of unemployment, both types of skills depreciate. Skill dynamics can be
motivated by the model of vintage human capital developed in Violante (2002). In
that model, skills are vintage-specific to the technology in one industry. With tech-
nological progress, original skills are only partially transferable to the new technol-
ogy, exhibiting as skill loss for individuals.3
Thinking first about the second period’s choice, it is clear that individuals with
z1(1− γ)+α1 ≥ z2 +α2 will be offered higher wages in industry 1 regardless of
their first-period choice. This defines a region in which α2 ≤ α1 +(z1− z2)− γz1.
Similarly, if α2 ≥ α1 +(z1− z2)+ γz2, individuals work in industry 2 regardless of
3See Neal (1995) for empirical evidence using displaced workers.
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their first-period choice. There is, however, a band in between, in which choice in
the second period is determined by choice in the first period. This is illustrated in
panel (a) of Figure 1, with the cutoffs being parallel lines with slopes of unity and
vertical distance γ(z2− z1). Choices in the first period have an effect on choices
in the second period, so even if the realizations of αs are not persistent, outcomes
(wages and matches to industry) will be persistent because of the skill dynamics.
Choices in the first period are made with regard to the expected depreciation of
skills before entering the second period. However, because the αs are not persistent,
the differences in future values between working in industry 1 and industry 2 today
do not involve current realizations of α . This means that the optimal cutoff in the
period is a line with slope of unity in α space, illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1.
Workers who graduate with skills z1i > z
2
i expect to work in industry 1 rather than
industry 2. However, as they enter the labor market, α is realized, and there is some
probability that wages in industry k are high enough to ensure that V (i,2)>V (i,1)
even when z1i > z
2
i . We say that these individuals are efficiently mismatched when
they end up working in a different industry than they trained for because of transi-
tory shocks to the labor market. This involves no loss to society or the workers. In
order to induce the current mismatch, current wage benefits to the mismatch must
not only be positive, but also larger than the increase in future depreciation of skills.
To illustrate what the business cycle could mean in such a context, imagine that
the α process can be decomposed such that
α jt = ζt +ν
j
t ,
into a cyclical factor shared by both industries, ζt , and an industry-wide component
independent of the cyclical factor, ν jt . In such a setting, the cyclical component
does not impact on the relative utility of industries 1 and 2, the α-values are shifted
parallel to the cutoffs in Figure 1, and the amount of efficient mismatch would be
the same.4
In the model so far, there is no unemployment and all production outcomes are
4A modification in which industry-wide productivity works multiplicatively instead of additively
as in (1) would tend to induce pro-cyclical efficient mismatch.
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efficient. But assume that workers are credit-constrained and have to achieve a min-
imum consumption level c, which can, if necessary, be financed with unemployment
benefits (which we, for simplicity, fix at c). Now only those jobs with α j ≥ c− z j
are feasible matches. In Figure 2 we have drawn this for a worker trained for indus-
try 1; the dashed lines indicate the feasibility constraints. The area A is the set of
α-realizations such that neither industry can help the worker realize the minimum
consumption requirement, and the worker collects unemployment benefits instead.
However, there is now also a triangular area B where the worker would, barring the
market inefficiencies, choose to work in industry 1. Doing so would preserve skills
better than taking the currently higher wage offered in industry 2. In the presence
of credit constraints, however, this worker cannot finance maintaining the skills he
or she trained for and is forced to work in industry 2, inefficiently mismatched.
While we saw that the cyclical component of the productivity shock shared by
both sectors was neutral with respect to mismatch with no market frictions, this
is no longer the case with the credit constraint. In good times, the α-realizations
are moved to the northeast of Figure 2 and fewer people are forced to accept a mis-
match because of credit constraints (in the B area). Inefficient mismatch is therefore
countercyclical in the same way as unemployment.
If the realizations of α1 and α2 are highly correlated, we will tend to see more
unemployment, because shocks cannot be buffered by workers going to work in
industries other than the ones they trained for. If the realizations are less correlated
there will be more mismatches, and the wage effects in the second period will be
smaller. Depreciation of skills that are not used will have the effect that mismatch
will tend to persist even if shocks to α are not. Mismatch will persist both with and
without the presence of credit constraints, but with credit constraints there will be
stronger long-term effects on realized wages, because workers will have to realize
more inefficient mismatches.
We have shown that skill mismatches, defined by workers choosing industries
valuing their skills less than others, could arise out of aggregate shocks, and the
model predicts that inefficient mismatch, as can arise with market imperfections, is
countercyclical. Efficient mismatch is neutral with respect to business cycle shocks.
In the empirical analysis below, we provide evidence that measured mismatch is
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countercyclical. The model also predicts that mismatch will be persistent. We
provide evidence that skill mismatch is indeed very persistent over the first ten years
after entering the labor market, even though business cycle shocks are presumably
temporary in nature.
2 Empirical Strategy
2.1 Measuring Skill Mismatch
Our approach is similar to Gottschalk and Hansen (2003), who classify noncollege
and college occupations according to estimated wage premiums paid to college-
educated workers. To measure skill mismatch, we first need to estimate zi, the vec-
tor of efficiency units in different industries for a given worker (zi = (z1i , . . . ,z
J
i )).
Assuming that the type of the worker can be predicted by his major in college, we
estimate zi by estimating industry-specific wage premiums paid for a given major.
Specifically, we run industry- and year-specific log earnings regressions on dum-
mies for fields of study in college, using young workers who have less than ten
years of potential experience. The estimated skill premiums are thus allowed to
vary by year. As well as eight dummies for fields of study, each regression includes
a dummy variable for females, a dummy variable for full-time workers, fixed ef-
fects for region of residence to control for regional differences in rental prices, and
a quadratic in potential experience measured by years since graduation.5 To ensure
that each industry employs a large enough number of graduates in each field, we
combine data for years t−1, t, and t +1 when estimating returns in t.
Every type of skill faces a distribution of wage premiums from all industries in
a given year. We define skill mismatch as when workers are working in industries
that reward their skills less than the median skill premium they would receive in that
year. We use the rank of an industry for a given skill as a proxy for the quality of
the worker-industry match. Note that because the regressions are run by year, any
common trend in wage growth will not affect the distribution of the skill premiums.
5We have tried adding a third-order polynomial term in experience, but this makes no substantial
difference.
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If the worker is unemployed for an entire calendar year, no mismatch indicator is
assigned.
The estimated industry- and year-specific skill premiums are biased, because
workers self-select into different majors and different industries. However, our goal
is to estimate changes in the mismatch (defined below using the estimated skill
premiums) over the business cycle, and it is reasonable to assume that college major
choice does not vary over the business cycle at the time of graduation. Berger
(1988) and Beffy, Fouge`re, and Arnaud (2012) provide evidence that the choice of
field by college students is not very responsive to business cycle variations in labor
market conditions. Part of the self-selection into industries may be correlated to
the business cycle, but this is precisely what we are after: we are interested in how
industry choices for a given type of skill vary with labor market conditions at the
time of graduation. We attempt to control for ability when estimating the long-term
consequences of the first industry choice in bad times. Our results indicate that
cyclical changes in skill mismatch measure changes in labor demand rather than
pure changes in the composition of supply of skills.
2.2 Estimating the Short- and Long-term Effects of Initial La-
bor Market Conditions
We approximate initial labor market conditions using the regional unemployment
rate at the time of graduation. We start by assuming that variations in unemploy-
ment rates reflect exogenous changes in local labor demand. In Section 5, we con-
duct various robustness tests providing support for this assumption. Our goal is to
identify the short- and long-term effects of initial labor market conditions on our
indicators of skill mismatch and on a range of other labor market outcomes such as
earnings, unemployment, and labor mobility.
Following Oreopoulos et al. (2012), we model the outcome variable in period t
for a graduating cohort c from region r as
ycrt = β1 +β e2Ucr +φt +θr + γe +ξc +u, (4)
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where θr,ξc,γe,φt are fixed effects for region of the college at the time of gradu-
ation, year of graduation (or graduating cohort c), year of potential labor market
experience and calendar year. Ucr is the regional unemployment rate measured at
the time of graduation and the region of the graduating school. The coefficients on
the initial unemployment rate, β e2 , are allowed to vary with levels of potential expe-
rience. Provided that variations in Ucr capture exogenous changes in labor demand,
the β e2 estimated using ordinary least squares captures the causal effect of initial
labor market conditions. As Oreopoulos et al. (2012) points out, β e2 estimates the
average change by experience level, given the regular evolution of the regional un-
employment rate faced in the future. It captures short- and long-term changes in
experience profiles from region-cohort-specific variations in unemployment rates.
In order to estimate the model, we first cluster our panel data into cells defined
by cohort, calendar year, and region of graduation. We then estimate equation (4)
weighted by the corresponding cell sizes. Since the main regressor Ucr varies by
region of graduation and cohort, we cluster the standard errors at region of gradu-
ation and cohort level. We drop one additional cohort effect from the regression in
order to identify cohort, experience, and year effects separately.
3 Data and Sample Selection
The data on workers used in our study are derived from administrative registers
and prepared for research by Statistics Norway. The data covers all Norwegian
residents aged 16–74 years old in the years 1986–2006. We have information about
employment relationships, labor income, educational attainment, field of education
and date of completion, labor market status, and a set of demographic variables such
as gender, age, experience, and marital status. A unique person identifier allows us
to follow workers over time. Likewise, each worker is matched to a firm, allowing
us to identify each worker’s employer. Regional labor market characteristics such
as unemployment rates are also available.
The sample used in our main analysis is constructed by first identifying the co-
horts graduating between 1980 and 2006. We then drop those who ever became
self-employed or ever returned to school and people with missing years of obser-
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vations. In our main sample, we include both men and women. We focus on the
first ten years following graduation from college. In the specifications of the main
analysis, only cohorts graduating in 1988 or later are used in the regression because
certain outcome variables such as the duration of registered unemployment is not
available before 1988 (but we use the cohorts prior to 1988 when calculating the
skill premia).
The main focus of the study is college graduates with 13–16 years of education
who graduate between the ages of 19 and 25. We have the exact date of gradua-
tion and the municipality of the college which any student attends, the latter being
important for calculating mobility patterns. We also have the exact date of initial en-
rolment and whether students take a shorter or longer time than the scheduled time
for a program. This is important when calculating whether students are delaying
finishing or rushing to finish depending on the business cycle.
We define seven categories of field of study based on the international standard
for education (Statistics Norway, 2003). These fields of study are given in Table 1.
We fix the field of study at the graduation year. We drop people whose education
relates to primary industries or who are in noncategorized fields. The other element
used when calculating the mismatch index is the seven industries defined using the
single-digit ISIC classification (Statistics Norway, 1983).6
Other outcomes used are annual earnings and mobility. Our measure of earn-
ings is the sum of pretax market income (from wages and self-employment) and
work-related cash transfers, such as unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, and
parental leave benefits. Regional mobility is measured by mobility between coun-
ties (there are 19 counties in Norway).
We use regional (county) level unemployment rates in our regression analysis.
The unemployment rate is taken from the Norwegian Labor and Welfare Organi-
zation (NAV). We exploit one major downturn and one smaller downturn plus two
6There is a trade-off in the choice of industry-field classifications. For example, to use more
detailed industries we would have had to amalgamate certain fields of study in order to have a
sufficiently large sample for each industry-field-year cell. To get a large enough sample size for all
industries, we merge agriculture, mining, electricity and water, and construction into one. We also
separate out social services, including health and education, because this comprises 30 percent of
the employment.
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upturns that took place in Norway in the data period. The national unemployment
rate is reported in Figure 3 for the period 1986–2006. Particularly interesting for
this analysis is the severe bust that took place in Norway at the beginning of the data
period starting in 1988/89. The downturn lasted until 1993, when unemployment
rates began to decrease. This is the deepest and longest-lasting downturn in Nor-
way since WWII. Unemployment rose from 1.5 percent to 5.5 percent, which is a
historically large unemployment rate in Norway.7 In addition to the unemployment
rate, about 3 percent of the labor force was also on different labor market programs.
One reason why the recession lasted so long was that a banking crisis was added to
the problem in 1991/92 when the large private banks had to be saved by the govern-
ment (Steigum, 2010). Following this recession, growth and employment picked
up and a boom took place around 1998 where the unemployment rate was down to
2.4 percent of the labor force. The recovery flattened out in 1998, but lasted until
2001. In 2001–2003 there was a mild recession before a new and strong expansion
started.
Information on IQ test scores is from Norwegian military records. Military ser-
vice is compulsory for all able males in Norway. Before entering the service, their
medical and psychological suitability is assessed: this occurs for the great majority
around their eighteenth birthday. The IQ measure is a composite score from three
timed IQ tests: arithmetic, word similarities, and figures.8 The composite IQ test
score is an unweighted mean of the three sub-tests. The IQ score is reported in sta-
nine (Standard Nine) units, a method of standardizing raw scores into a nine-point
standard scale with a normal distribution, a mean of 5, and a standard deviation of
2.
7These numbers are based on those fully unemployed persons registered at the national insurance
offices on a particular week each year. If the annual unemployment survey data from Statistics
Norway is used, the unemployment rate is about one percentage point higher.
8The arithmetic test is quite similar to the arithmetic test in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS) (Sundet, Tambs, Harris, Magnus, and Torjussen, 2005; Cronbach, 1964). The word test is
similar to the vocabulary test in WAIS, and the figures test is similar to the Raven Progressive Matrix
test (Cronbach, 1964). See Sundet, Barlaug, and Torjussen (2004), Sundet et al. (2005), and Thrane
(1977) for details.
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4 Estimation Results
We begin this section by documenting the short- and long-term effects of graduat-
ing in recessions using the Norwegian data. We then provide empirical evidence
that cyclical skill mismatch is an important mechanism explaining the persistent
career loss. Specifically, we examine how skill mismatch changes over the busi-
ness cycle, and estimate the long-term effects of initial labor market conditions for
initially mismatched and nonmismatched workers. Finally, we discuss some ro-
bustness checks relating to our assumptions about the initial unemployment rate
(our measure of recessions) and on the impact of composition changes for initially
mismatched workers over the business cycle.
4.1 The Short- and Long-term Effects of Graduating in a Re-
cession
Figure 5 plots the experience profiles of log annual real earnings by cohorts. There
are large variations in starting wages across cohorts, which appear strongly corre-
lated with business cycles. The initial differences gradually fade out and earnings
across cohorts converge in a little over five years. Indeed, the earnings for peo-
ple who are five years into the labor market show only minor variations over the
business cycle. Figure 6 provides a clear picture of the negative correlation be-
tween starting wages and the national unemployment rate, both expressed in terms
of deviations from their means. The correlations with initial unemployment rate
decrease quickly as labor market experience grows. This pattern is very similar to
studies using data from other countries.
We then investigate the effect of initial labor market conditions on a range of
labor market outcomes, using the regression framework described earlier.9 Figure
7 shows the point estimates and the 95% confidence bands of the effects of regional
unemployment rate on annual log real earnings, whether becoming unemployed at
9To be consistent with our definition of mismatch (which is based on the worker-industry match
in the first year after graduation), we only look at workers who report an employer in the first year
after graduation. Assuming people who remain unemployed in the first year are more likely to fare
worse, the estimates are likely to be lower bounds of the true effects of initial conditions over the
whole sample.
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any time of the year, and months of registered unemployment in a year.10 Panel
A demonstrates that graduates in recessions suffer from significant earnings loss in
the first few years after college. A one-percentage-point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate leads to four-percent-lower annual earnings in the first two years after
graduation. The losses in annual earnings become insignificant by the fourth year
after graduation. Compared with Oreopoulos et al. (2012), the magnitude of the
initial earnings loss is similar, but the losses in earnings are less persistent.11 With
generous unemployment protection in Norway, workers are more likely to choose
unemployment rather than working at jobs with significant wage reductions. This
is confirmed when we turn to the effects on indices of unemployment in the last
two columns in Panel A. While the effects on annual earnings have been limited
to the first three years, the effects on unemployment are strong and persistent. We
find that a one-percentage-point rise in the local unemployment rate increases the
probability of unemployment by one percent in the first year after college, and the
effects are persistent up to eight years after graduation. The effect on the duration
of registered unemployment also persists over almost the entire first ten years.
Panel B shows the effects of graduating in a recession on labor mobility. The
literature has argued that job mobility is the main mechanism of recovery from grad-
uating in a recession. Our estimates are consistent with the literature. For people
graduating in recessions, the probability of an annual job change increases signifi-
cantly in the first few years, followed by a gradual decline. In addition, graduates
entering the labor market in recessions are more likely to switch industries through-
out their careers.12 Regional mobility, however, does not appear to be correlated
with regional labor market conditions at the time of graduation.
Finally, we show the effects of initial labor market conditions on permanent
firm characteristics. We measure firm characteristics by the mean size of establish-
ment and the average wages paid to all workers over all years, which are typically
10Unemployment is defined as having nonzero months of registered unemployment or being in
one of the government-sponsored training programs targeting the unemployed.
11The initial loss in earnings remains less persistent even if we only include workers who are
employed in all years in the sample (in this case, the initial loss is smaller).
12Job mobility and industry mobility are identified by annual change in employer ID and industry
code, respectively.
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regarded as a proxy for firm quality.13 The estimated effects of regional unem-
ployment rate reveal changes in employer quality over time. Panel C demonstrates
that there is a significant decline in the quality of the first employer when graduat-
ing during recessions. Firm qualities quickly improve in the following two years,
consistent with the periods when job mobility is highest.
4.2 The Effect of Recessions on Skill Mismatch
The mean estimated skill premiums over all years for all industries are summa-
rized in Table 1. There are substantial differences in the wage premiums paid for
a given type of skill. For example, graduates with a degree in Health and Welfare
are valued most in the Social and Related Community Services sector and least in
the Manufacturing sector. According to our definition, the manufacturing sector is
a mismatch for these graduates. There are also considerable variations in the wage
premiums for different skills within an industry. For example, the wage premium
for skills in Business in the Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services
sector is three times as much as the wage premium paid for skills in Humanities and
Arts.
In Figure 4, we plot the probability of mismatch by experience level and the
national unemployment rate against years of graduation. These are expressed as
deviations from the mean. We find a positive correlation between the probability
of mismatch and the national unemployment rate. This correlation appears highly
persistent, and is evident even five years after labor market entry.
To identify the true cyclical variations in mismatch, we estimate equation (4)
using mismatch as an outcome variable. The regression analysis allows us to con-
trol for permanent differences across regions of graduation and graduating cohorts.
The first three columns in Table 2 present the estimated effects of initial regional
unemployment rate by years since graduation. Column (1) clearly shows a persis-
tent positive effect on the probability of mismatch from graduating in a recession.
A one percent increase in the regional unemployment rate at the time of graduation
leads to a 3.4% increase in the probability of a mismatch in the first year. Given that
13Note that we use the mean annual earnings for all workers in a given plant at a given time
(November of each year) as a proxy for firm-specific wages.
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the average probability of skill mismatch in the first year is 0.32, this represents an
increase of more than 10%. The effect deteriorates by about one-third by five years
after graduation, suggesting that some initially mismatched college graduates find
their way back to the industries matching their skills. However, even five years af-
ter labor market entrance, the probability of mismatch remains nearly 2% higher for
workers graduating from worse economic conditions. The persistent effects from
initial labor market conditions indicate that a substantial number of mismatched
graduates did not switch to the “right” industries in the long run.
Column (2) reports results for graduates whose fields of study were most likely
to lead to careers in health and education, which account for a large share of public
employment. Interestingly, we do not find any significant effects of initial labor
market conditions on the likelihood of an initial placement mismatch. In contrast,
graduates majoring in other fields, which are more likely to lead to private sector
employment, are more likely to be mismatched over their entire early careers (col-
umn 3). One possible explanation is that demand shocks in the public sector are less
cyclical, which leads to acyclical mismatch under the assumptions of our theoretical
model.
In columns (4)–(6), we consider an alternative approach and create an index of
industry-skill match quality based on the estimated skill premiums. We rank all the
industries from 1 to 7 (7 being the highest) according to the wage premium for a
given skill type in a given year. We use this rank variable as a measure of match
quality and estimate equation (4). The estimated coefficients β e2 capture changes in
the quality of the industry-skill match over time. Consistent with our findings from
the mismatch indicator, we find persistent downgrading of the industry-skill match
quality for workers graduating in recessions. Those graduating in recessions are
more likely to accept jobs in “worse” industries than in industries they would have
entered under normal economic conditions. Given that the mean match quality is
around five, with an increase in unemployment of three percentage points (corre-
sponding to a shift in unemployment rate from good to bad times), match quality
is about 9% lower in the first year and remains nearly 5% lower ten years later.
The results are entirely driven by graduates majoring in fields aimed at work in the
sector, who experience larger and more persistent negative effects on their match
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quality. Graduates with majors for careers in the public sector do not experience
any downgrading in the quality of their matches.
The finding that temporary macroeconomic shocks can have persistent effects
on the industry-skill match quality is striking. Nevertheless, this is consistent with
our model, where temporary industry-wide technology shocks may generate persis-
tent skill mismatch over the long run. In Table 3, we show how the persistence and
magnitude of cyclical mismatch varies with age-adjusted IQ scores.14 We divide
our sample into four groups based on the quartiles of age-adjusted IQ scores and
repeat our exercise on the probability of mismatch and the match quality on each
group. We find that graduates whose IQ scores are in the bottom quartile fare worst
in adverse economic conditions: they are almost twice as likely to be mismatched
throughout the first ten years. A typical recession, with a rise in unemployment
rate of three percentage points, leads to an 18% downgrading in the quality of their
matches.15 People who are in the lower and upper middle quartiles appear to be
able to find the right match six years after graduating during recessions. Interest-
ingly, the top quartile group appears to fare worse than the upper middle quartile.16
Therefore, the pool of cyclical mismatched workers consists of individuals at both
the bottom and the top of the IQ distribution.
4.3 Cyclical Skill Mismatch and the Long-term Effects of Grad-
uating in a Recession
In this section, we document the long-term effects on labor market outcomes and
potential mechanisms of recovery of graduating in a recession for initially mis-
matched and nonmismatched workers, respectively. Our goal is to compare the
labor market outcomes of initially mismatched workers in bad times with those of
14Age-adjusted IQ score is constructed by subtracting the age-specific mean (age at the time of
the test) and dividing it by the age-specific standard deviation.
15The average match quality for this group is 4.5.
16We find that students in the top quartile are the least likely to choose a field of study leading to
a career in the public sector. The percentages of people choosing public fields of study are 12.84,
11.01, 9.04, and 6.68% for the four quartiles from the bottom to the top, respectively. However, the
fact that the lowest quartiles are more likely to choose the public sector, and yet they are still more
likely to be mismatched, indicates that this isn’t a complete explanation.
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individuals who are mismatched in good times. Initial mismatch is defined by the
field of study and the employer’s industry in the first year following graduation.
We estimate the same empirical model described in equation (4). However,
the composition of mismatched workers in good times may be different from the
composition of mismatched workers in bad times. For example, in good times,
low-ability workers may be more likely to be mismatched than high-ability work-
ers. To identify the effects of business cycles on labor market outcomes of initially
mismatched workers, we have tried to control for differences in ability through
information on IQ test scores available only for males from Norwegian military
records. Details of this exercise are discussed in the next section. In summary, con-
trolling for IQ scores leads to minor changes in the estimated effects of initial labor
market conditions. Given the presence of cohort and region effects, region-cohort-
specific variation in IQ explains little of the changes in experience profiles in labor
market outcomes. We therefore continue to focus on the entire sample (including
both males and females) and estimate equation (4) on the initially mismatched and
initially nonmismatched sample separately.
We find that initially mismatched workers from bad times suffer from persistent
career losses compared with mismatched workers from good times. The careers of
graduates who are initially matched to the right industry are largely immune from
the negative impact of graduating in recessions in the medium run. Figure 8 shows
that there are large differences in the extent of earnings loss in the first few years.
Mismatched workers experience three-times-larger losses in annual earnings in the
first few years than nonmismatched workers. Almost all of the persistent effects on
unemployment are driven by mismatched workers. For initially mismatched work-
ers, the effects on unemployment are strong and persistent up to eight years after
graduation. For nonmismatched workers, the positive effects on unemployment are
small and limited to the first two years after graduation.
Figure 9 shows the effects of graduating in a recession on labor mobility. Work-
ers who are mismatched in bad times are more likely to switch industries during
the first ten years following graduation than mismatched workers in good times.
The effects for nonmismatched workers are small and temporary. Consistent with
the effects on industry mobility, we find more persistent effects on job mobility for
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mismatched workers graduating in recessions. The evidence on industry and job
mobility indicates that cyclical mismatched workers from bad times search more
intensively for better matches. Again, the effects on regional mobility are small,
although nonmismatched workers in a recession appear more likely to be mobile
across regions in the first few years following graduation.
Turning to the effects on firm quality, we find that there are important differ-
ences in the effects of initial labor market conditions between initially mismatched
and nonmismatched workers. Initially mismatched workers from recessions are
more likely to start working for lower-quality employers, and firm quality improves
quickly in the first few years. For initially nonmismatched workers in recessions,
there is no significant evidence on initial down-ranking of firm quality compared
with nonmismatched workers in good times. It appears that within-firm recovery
is a more important mechanism for nonmismatched graduates from recessions. For
nonmismatched graduates from recessions, job mobility and industry mobility ap-
pear to be more important mechanisms behind the recovery process.
To summarize, we document important differences in the effect of initial labor
market conditions and the process of recovery between initially mismatched and
nonmismatched workers. Overall, a high unemployment rate leads to worse labor
market outcomes for mismatched graduates than nonmismatched graduates, both in
the short and long runs. Given that a higher unemployment rate also increases the
probability of skill mismatch in the first job, we conclude that skill mismatch is an
important factor accounting for the overall effects of graduating in recessions. The
fact that initial unemployment rate has a very persistent effect on skill mismatch but
a less persistent effect on wages provides indirect evidence that the accumulation of
industry-specific human capital is an important mechanism in the recovery process.
Some workers manage to switch back to the “right” industry, as evidenced by high
industry mobility for the initially mismatched workers. Some initially mismatched
workers acquire new skills through on-the-job training, thereby changing the skill
composition of the worker and the match qualities with their current employers.
Still, for some workers, high-frequency industry/job mobility indicates that they
never accumulate many industry-specific skills, leading to high rates of turnover
between employment and unemployment.
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5 Robustness Checks
Initial Unemployment Rate. So far, we have assumed that the local unemployment
rate at the time of graduation captures exogenous labor demand shocks. However,
if college students act upon the regional unemployment rate by choosing the re-
gional of graduation and the timing of graduation, the initial unemployment rate is
endogenous. To tackle the first source of endogeneity, we replace the school region
with the region of residence at the time of graduation and use the initial unem-
ployment rate at the region of residence as the key independent variable. Region
of residence might differ from the school region, because during most of our time
period, students would still be recorded in administrative registers as residing with
their parents. We also experimented by clustering our preferred definition of labor
market regions (at county level) into larger labor market areas (North, Mid-north,
West, South, and East). Neither of the alternatives changed our previous results in
any significant way.17 The region of the school remains our preferred measure of
local labor market, because graduates typically start looking for jobs in the school
region.
To test whether there is selective timing of graduation, we use a variable created
by Statistics Norway documenting the number of semesters beyond the program
duration. From this variable, we create a dichotomous variable, Dcr, which equals
one if a college graduate delays graduation. We collapse our individual-level data at
the level of graduation cohort and region of graduation and estimate the following
equation using ordinary least squares:
Dcr = β1 +β2Ucr +θr +ξc +u, (5)
where θr and ξc are unrestricted region and cohort fixed effects as before. If there
is selective timing of graduation, we would expect β2 to be positive. We do not
find any direct evidence of selective timing of graduation at cohort-region level: the
estimated β2s in the first column of Table 4 are insignificant.
Finally, to provide direct evidence that qualities of graduating cohorts do not
17The complete results are available from the authors upon request.
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vary with initial unemployment rates, we use the age-adjusted IQ score defined
earlier as the dependent variable in equation (5) (second column of Table 4). We do
not find any evidence that cohort quality varies with initial labor market conditions,
conditional on permanent cohort and region fixed effects.
Results on Initially Mismatched Men Controlling for Ability. To estimate
the effect of initial labor market conditions for the initially mismatched workers,
we need to control for differences in ability between mismatched workers from
good and bad times. Therefore, when estimating equation (4), we include IQ and
IQ interacted with experience dummies (collapsed at region-cohort level) in the
independent variables. The interaction terms also allow experience profiles to shift
with IQ levels. Because the IQ test scores are only available for males, we restrict
our sample to male graduates only.
Figure 11-13 shows the estimated long-term effects of initial labor market con-
ditions controlling for ability through IQ test scores. Overall, these pictures look
very similar to our earlier findings over the entire sample without controlling for
IQ. We find that initially mismatched male workers experience persistently nega-
tive effects on earnings and unemployment from graduating in recessions (Figure
11). Interestingly, the effects on unemployment are less persistent among initially
mismatched men, suggesting that cyclical mismatched women are more likely to
be persistently unemployed after graduating during recessions. In contrast, male
workers who are matched with the right industry in bad times do not experience sig-
nificant earnings or employment losses when compared with those matched to the
same industries in good times. Industry mobility and job mobility toward higher-
quality firms remain the important mechanisms behind the catch-up process for
mismatched male workers from bad times (Figure 12-13).
6 Conclusion
The explanations suggested for the long-term effects of short-term cyclical vari-
ations in labor market conditions vary from the initial quality of the firm-worker
match to the pro-cyclical effect on promotion. None of the mechanisms proposed
so far have paid specific attention to matching supply of heterogeneous skills within
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graduating cohorts of graduates and the heterogeneous demand for skills across dif-
ferent industries. In this paper, we define the type of skill supplied by the field of
study in college. We propose that skill mismatch, defined as mismatch between the
skills supplied by college graduates and skills demanded by hiring industries, is an-
other important mechanism behind the persistent career loss caused by graduating
in recessions.
We focus on how skill mismatch varies over the business cycle. We find that
there is a strong countercyclical pattern of skill mismatch among college graduates
entering the labor market, while initial labor market conditions have a declining but
persistent effect on the probability of mismatch over the early career of these grad-
uates. Based on this measure, we estimate the causal effect of initial labor market
conditions on skill mismatched and nonmismatched workers separately by compar-
ing mismatched workers graduating during recessions with mismatched workers
graduating during booms. We do so conditional on permanent cohort and region
characteristics, and in a robustness check on a male subpopulation we are also able
to control for cognitive ability.
We find that initially mismatched graduates (i.e., those who were mismatched
to the wrong industry on the first job) are much more vulnerable to business cycle
variations at the time of graduation. The careers of graduates who are matched to
the right industry are largely immune from the negative impact of graduating in
recessions. Our findings suggest that cyclical mismatched workers, that is, workers
who are mismatched due to worse labor market conditions, could be driving the
long-term career loss found in many studies. For these workers, industry mobility
and job mobility are important mechanisms of recovery from initial losses.
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Table 2: The Effect of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Probability of Mismatch
and the Quality of the Industry-Skill Match
Mismatch Rank of Matched Industry
Effect by Years of All Fields Public Private All Fields Public Private
Potential Experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 0.034*** 0.004 0.047*** -0.141*** -0.006 -0.199***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024)
2 0.031*** -0.000 0.042*** -0.129*** 0.009 -0.176***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.026) (0.017) (0.024)
3 0.028*** -0.005 0.039*** -0.111*** 0.028* -0.152***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.026) (0.017) (0.027)
4 0.022*** -0.009** 0.034*** -0.083*** 0.041** -0.124***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.027) (0.016) (0.028)
5 0.022*** -0.008** 0.035*** -0.075*** 0.039** -0.114***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.028) (0.017) (0.028)
6 0.021*** -0.011*** 0.037*** -0.070** 0.050*** -0.126***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.028) (0.016) (0.029)
7 0.017** -0.009** 0.031*** -0.069** 0.042** -0.132***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.029) (0.017) (0.030)
8 0.017** -0.008** 0.031*** -0.086*** 0.038** -0.159***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.031) (0.017) (0.034)
9 0.022*** -0.010** 0.039*** -0.089*** 0.050** -0.166***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.030) (0.020) (0.033)
10 0.024*** -0.008* 0.041*** -0.084*** 0.039** -0.154***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.029) (0.020) (0.028)
R2 0.69 0.44 0.53 0.74 0.52 0.63
Observations 2375 2375 2375 2375 2375 2375
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Public refers to fields of study in Teacher Training
and Pedagogy and Health, Welfare and Sport. Private refers to all other fields.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks: The Effect of Initial Labor Market Conditions on the
Timing of Graduation and Age-adjusted IQ Score
Delayed Graduation Age-adjusted IQ Score
(1) (2)
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.009 0.005
(0.009) (0.017)
R2 0.52 0.54
Observations 323 342
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 1: Choices in first and second period in α space for a given (z1,z2).
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Figure 2: Unemployment and inefficient mismatch with a minimum consumption
requirement for a given (z1,z2).
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Figure 3: National Unemployment Rate in Norway, 1986–2006
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Figure 4: Skill Mismatch by Experience and the National Unemployment Rate
Note: We regress the probability of mismatch on dummies for years of potential experiences and
regress the national unemployment rate on a constant term. We plot the residuals against the year of
graduation.
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Figure 5: Experience Profiles of Log Annual Real Earnings by Cohorts
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Figure 6: Log Annual Real Earnings and the National Unemployment Rate
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Figure 7: Long-term Effects of Initial Labor Market Conditions: All Workers
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Figure 8: Long-term Effects of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Earnings and
Employment: Initially (Non-)Mismatched Workers
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Figure 9: Long-term Effects of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Labor Mobility:
Initially (Non-)Mismatched Workers
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Figure 10: Long-term Effects of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Permanent
Firm Characteristics: Initially (Non-)Mismatched Workers
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Figure 11: Long-term Effects of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Earnings and
Employment: Initially (Non-)Mismatched Male Workers. Drawn for Average Level
of Ability.
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Figure 12: Long-term Effects of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Labor Mo-
bility: Initially (Non-)Mismatched Male Workers. Drawn for Average Level of
Ability.
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Figure 13: Long-term Effects of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Permanent
Firm Characteristics: Initially (Non-)Mismatched Male Workers. Drawn for Aver-
age Level of Ability.
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